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CHAPTER 8




What we know is enabled and constrained by what we are. I know a very 
different world from that of a butterfly even though we both live in the 
“same” world. The butterfly perceives what is of value to it: what it can 
eat, the places it can land, and the dangers it must evade. And, almost all 
of these are different from the aspects of the world that show up to me as 
meaningful. While we share a world, in some sense our environments are 
different. These observations may seem trivial but in fact they can serve to 
unpack a sharp divergence in approaches to understanding perception and 
cognition in the philosophy of cognitive science. On the one hand, there 
is a dominant approach which takes perception to be the representation of 
an external world and cognition to be the manipulation of those represen-
tations. And, on the other, there are more recent embodied, embedded, 
enactive, and extended approaches in which perception and cognition are 
taken to be activities or processes which organisms enact in relation to the 
world. On this model an animal’s body plays a non-trivial role in the 
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activities of perceiving and cognising by relating it to aspects of the world 
that are relevant to it. Moreover, this activity of the body in relation to the 
world is the enactment of an environment for the animal, an environment 
that is different from one animal to the next, and which—as we will see—
can scaffold us from simple responses to stimuli to cultural creations. The 
purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to some of the key 
ways in which cognition is taken to be world-involving on this second 
approach, ways that I believe will resonate with non-western thought.
There is a natural fit between embodied, embedded, enactive, and 
extended (“4E”) approaches to philosophy and cognitive science with 
some of the ways of thinking pervasive in some non-Western philosophical 
traditions. We can see that this is not a coincidence if we look at the intel-
lectual backgrounds of and influences on some of the key researchers in 4E 
philosophy and cognitive science. For example, Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch’s book The Embodied Mind (Varela et al. 1991/2017), which intro-
duced enactivism to the philosophy and cognitive science communities, is 
probably one of the most influential books to bring cognitive science into 
dialogue with Buddhist philosophy (in particular). Evan Thompson stud-
ied Asian Philosophy (including Chinese Philosophy) before training in 
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (and continues to work on 
Buddhism1). Francisco Varela was also influenced by Chinese Philosophy, 
which can be seen explicitly in his book Ethical Know-How: Action, 
Wisdom, and Cognition (Varela 1992/1999). It is therefore unsurprising 
that we see resonances between enactivism and Chinese Philosophy. In 
addition, much of the other work in 4E philosophy, even if it does not 
explicitly identify as enactivism, is inspired by or influenced by The 
Embodied Mind and/or Heideggerian ideas which themselves take inspira-
tion from Classical Chinese and Japanese Philosophy.
Researchers in 4E philosophy of mind and cognitive science tend to 
understand cognitive and social phenomena as relational, dynamic pro-
cesses and have a deep appreciation for the subtlety of complex systems. 
This results in explanations of perceptual and cognitive phenomena that 
breach the boundaries of skin and skull, explanations that are “extended”.2 
1 See, for example, Thompson (2014).
2 Not all of the “Es” in 4E cognition are necessarily consistent with each other so it is not 
the case that “extended mind” proponents are necessarily enactivists or vice versa (for some 
discussions of this, see (Thompson and Stapleton 2009); (Ward and Stapleton 2012); (Ward 
et  al. 2017). Nevertheless, the term “4E” or “4EA” (where “A” stands for “Affective”) 
serves to capture a general category of approaches that take an attitude of openness to inves-
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Increasingly, philosophers of mind and cognition are now returning to 
non-Western traditions to see examples-in-action of philosophising in 
which there is no default assumption of a strong subject-world divide or 
that the individual is separate from, and ontologically and ethically prior 
to, culture and society.3 These are assumptions which pervade “Western” 
philosophy and against which researchers within the various embodied, 
embedded, extended, and enactive approaches have been reacting with 
their criticisms of orthodox analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive sci-
ence. Part of this project (if we can generalise such a diverse collection of 
researchers as having a “project”) is exactly to cash out how we might 
understand cognition if we do not start from these default Cartesian and 
individualist assumptions. In this chapter, I will introduce a collection of 
concepts and ideas that are routinely drawn upon by researchers in this 
tradition in their various attempts to do this. Approaching this task from a 
bottom-up perspective, I also try to show how these concepts that are 
drawn from sometimes very disparate lineages can coherently be seen to 
interconnect and build on each other. The result of this is a world view in 
which cognition is not an internal process of an individual who is seen as 
separate from the world that it lives in and acts on. Rather, it is the activity 
of an organism deeply embedded in relations with the physical, interper-
sonal, and cultural world. A world view that has strong resonances with 
the thinking underpinning much of Classical Chinese Philosophy.
2  cognItIon as World-InvolvIng rather than 
World-representIng
Traditional cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind is “internal-
ist” in the sense that it presumes that all of the important computational 
crunching that makes up cognition is taken to be going on inside the 
head. On this model, our butterfly perceives the world by representing the 
leaves, the nectar, and the bird in its tiny mind even if not “as” leaves/
tigating the important roles that body, action, and world variously play in our perception and 
cognition. It is this broad sense that I am using the term “extended” to capture. This is 
consistent with the way it has come to be used in the cognitive sciences outwith the meta-
physics of mind debates.
3 For an example of the 4E approach being unpacked in respect to Confucian philosophy, 
see (Ott 2017). For examples of papers putting Japanese Philosophy into dialogue with 
themes and issues prevalent in 4E philosophy of mind and cognition, see (Krueger 2013, 
2020) and (McKinney 2020).
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nectar/bird but merely as rest/food/threat. If we attribute to the but-
terfly any cognitive capacity rather than mere stimulus–response mecha-
nisms, then this cognitive capacity consists in computations over these 
representations along the lines of [threat+near=fly now] or 
[food+hunger=fly towards]. This approach might seem to be a simple and 
plausible mechanism for perception and cognition. And we can certainly 
build highly complex representational/computational models of many 
functions that are deemed “cognitive” as many successes in Artificial 
Intelligence research are testament to. However, it can be criticised for 
being biologically implausible, for failing to incorporate genuine value for 
the system, and for failing to enable flexible, adaptive behaviours in differ-
ent contexts and environments. Moreover, on this approach there is a 
stark Cartesian mind/world divide that separates “the organism” that 
senses from “the world” in which it acts. Susan Hurley nicely described 
this view of how perception, action, and cognition are related as the 
“Classical Sandwich” model (Hurley 1998). On this “classical” view, cog-
nition is separated from perception and action; perception feeds informa-
tion to the organ of cognition, which then gives instructions for bodily 
acting. Acting of course will change the information available for perceiv-
ing, and so there is a feedback cycle but it is one in which this “feedback” 
is just the trigger for a new linear loop.
The classical sandwich model of perception, cognition, and action may 
seem like a common-sense view. However, even if one takes a cognitivist 
approach and assumes that cognition is the manipulation of internal rep-
resentations, there is reason to doubt this model of perception4. Over the 
last forty years, there has been a lot of work in neuroscience and psychol-
ogy that suggests that the perception, cognition, and action connections 
look less like a sandwich and more like a bowl of spaghetti. It is often not 
clear where one “function” (i.e. perception, cognition, or action) ends 
and another begins. Moreover, even if we separate out these functions and 
view them independently, we see that they feed back to each other not 
only at the end of each functional “act” but recurrently throughout these 
very acts themselves.5
In contrast to the cognitivist approaches, much of the work that falls 
under the banner of “extended” or “enactive” cognition takes perception 
4 For summaries of some of this work, see especially (Clark 1997); (Noë 2004, 2010); 
(Stapleton 2013).
5 See, for example, (Barrett and Bar 2009) for a clear model of this.
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and cognition to be activities.6 These approaches do not deny that the 
brain plays an important role in perceiving and cognising in many animals. 
However, they are “externalist” in that they argue that we are first and 
foremost embodied organisms embedded in an environment, and the 
result of this is that many of our perceptual and cognitive abilities are 
world-involving.7 On this view, action and perception are connected fun-
damentally. Not in terms of perception-causing action and action-causing 
perception nor even in terms of action being required for perception to 
develop normally (though these observations may be true). Rather, action 
seems to be constitutive of perception; the very act of perceiving involves 
action. Examples of this range from the fact that even my perceiving when 
I stand very still involves my eyes making many microsaccades per second 
in order for me to be able to see, to the way that dogs (and us) catch balls 
not by magnificent feats of internal calculations involving representing tra-
jectory and speed but instead by taking embodied short-cuts such as 
adjusting one’s running speed towards the ball so that the ball looks like it 
is falling at a constant rate.8 This approach to understanding the way that 
perception and action are fundamentally intertwined is usually labelled as 
an “enactive” account of perception (Varela et al. 1991/2017; Thompson 
2007) or as “sensorimotor contingency theory” (O’Regan and Noë 
2001). There are various claims that go along with these particular 
accounts some of which may be more or less palatable to philosophers of 
different temperaments. But, the basic insight outlined above, that action 
is part and parcel of perception, is now considered to be the orthodox 
understanding of how perception works and is taken for granted by 
researchers in both the philosophy of perception and the perception 
6 Research within these embodied, extended, and enactive approaches has flourished in 
recent years with the developments in philosophy matched by those in robotics, psychology, 
psychiatry, and cognitive science more generally. For some representative overviews, see 
(Clark 1997; 1999; 2008); (Di Paolo et al. 2017), (Gallagher 2005, 2017); (Pfeifer et al. 
2007); (Thompson 2007); (Varga 2018).
7 Externalism of course has rather different meanings in the various subdisciplines of phi-
losophy. To avoid conflation with these other kinds of externalism (especially e.g., the “twin-
earth” semantic externalism of Putnam and Burge), we can talk instead in terms of “extended 
cognition” in which the term “extended” is broadly construed to include, for example, enac-
tive approaches rather than just referring to the particular line of research following from the 
publication of (Clark and Chalmers 1998) paper “The Extended Mind”.
8 See Chap. 1 of Andy Clark’s Being There (Clark 1997) and Chap. 3 of Di Paolo, 
Buhrmann, and Barandiaran’s Sensorimotor Life (Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran 
2017) for accessible introductions to this kind of research.
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sciences. Implicit in this account is that the way our body is shaped (and 
therefore the actions that are available to us) is going to enable and con-
strain what is available to be perceived.
3  cognItIon from the Bottom-up
One other difference in these two approaches is the starting point for their 
explanatory endeavour. The traditional cognitivist approach generally 
takes as its primary explanandum human-level (not butterfly-level!) cogni-
tion, and it attempts to explain perception and cognition from this van-
tage point. In this respect we might think of cognitivism as a “top-down” 
approach; it starts with human capacities (indeed often adult human 
capacities) and seeks to understand how they function in terms of simpler 
mechanisms which may or may not be present in non-human animals. 
Extended and enactive approaches, on the other hand, often start from 
the vantage point of simple creatures or (robotic) critters that are able to 
behave in ways relevantly similar to what we might consider as perceptual 
or “cognitive” without performing complex computations over represen-
tations. Rather than constructing internal models of the world, they con-
sider the world to be—at least much of the time—“its own best model” 
(Brooks 1991). Extended and enactive approaches might thus be thought 
of as “bottom-up” approaches as the challenge for these researchers is to 
then explore how well these kind of perceptual and cognitive abilities 
“scale up” to human-level cognition: How much of human cognition can 
be explained without having to appeal to internal computations over 
representations?9
This bottom-up approach is most evident in the enactive paradigm 
instigated by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch which 
has subsequently been labelled “autopoietic enactivism”10 to distinguish it 
9 This generalisation captures much of the work that goes under the banner of extended 
cognition broadly construed as well as enactivism. However, there is work in the extended 
cognition stream of research that is better characterised as top-down according to this cate-
gorisation—indeed, much of the work in respect to the extended-mind hypothesis is repre-
sentationalist. Nevertheless, much of the research in the extended cognition paradigm that is 
more cognitive science oriented draws upon and relies upon this kind of bottom-up research, 
and this is in clear contrast to the classical cognitivist approach.
10 For short, accessible introductions to enactivism see (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014) 
and (Thompson and Stapleton 2009). In depth presentations of the approach are available 
in (Thompson 2007) and (Di Paolo et al. 2017).
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from more recent approaches which focus solely on perception (“senso-
rimotor enactivism”) and those whose primary motivation is to debunk 
representational models of mind (“radical enactivism”).11 Researchers 
within autopoietic enactivism (which I will just refer to as “enactivism” 
from now on) take inspiration from the self-organising and self-producing 
nature of individual cells and take the view that fundamental aspects of 
cognition can already be observed (at least in “proto” form) in this most 
minimal form of life. The most common example used is of a bacterium 
swimming in a sugar gradient. Although a bacterium is just a single cell 
and has no nervous system, it is able to sense the parts of the world that 
are of value for it and move towards them. What it is for something to 
have value for it is that it plays a role in the bacterium’s self-generation 
processes. Sugar can be metabolised by the bacterium to help the system 
self-organise and generate the things it needs to keep itself alive in a world 
of precarity. The world is precarious—even for a bacterium—because bac-
teria do not typically live in a world in which there is a constant supply of 
nutrients. If it finds itself in a situation where there is not a sufficient sup-
ply and it does nothing, then its organisation will disintegrate. It needs 
energy to generate the continuously dynamic processes that produce the 
parts of the cell that make up its boundary. Without a boundary it disinte-
grates and is no longer an organism.
There are two key ways in which the example of the bacterium is used 
to help us understand the enactive approach to cognition. Firstly, it helps 
us to see that it is the organisation of the cell itself that makes it a living 
organism. This organisation generates the very processes that make it an 
organism distinct from the environment by creating its boundary (i.e. the 
cell membrane) which then enables this organisation to arise and con-
tinue. This autopoietic (self-generating and self-producing) organisation 
distinguishes the cell from the surrounding milieu and allows it to con-
tinue existing so long as it is in an environment which provides the right 
materials for it to metabolise. What is important here is the recursive 
organisation and not the particular implementation of that organisation. 
This means that it is not autopoiesis and the self-generation of a physical 
boundary that is the key insight. Rather, it is because this autopoietic 
organisation evident in the cell instantiates an autonomous system. And, 
being an adaptive autonomous system is a principal feature of systems that 
we deem cognitive (like ourselves). Thus, there is a continuity between 
11 See (Ward et al. 2017) for an accessible introduction to the different enactive approaches.
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even such simple organisms as bacteria and complex organisms like our-
selves; that we all instantiate adaptive, autonomous organisation. This 
notion of autonomy (and its role in the deep continuity between mind and 
life) is introduced in Francisco Varela’s monograph Principles of Biological 
Autonomy (Varela 1979) and further developed in Evan Thompson’s 
landmark exploration of the continuity between life and mind, Mind in 
Life (Thompson 2007). It can be summarised as follows:
An autonomous system is a system composed of processes that generate  
and sustain that system as a unity and thereby also define an environment for 
the system. […] Considered abstractly, for a system to be autonomous, its 
constituent processes must meet the following conditions: […They…]
(1)  recursively depend on each other for their generation and their realiza-
tion as a network;
(2) constitute the system as a unity in whatever domain they exist; and
(3) determine a domain of possible interactions with the world.
This definition captures what Varela (1979, 1999) meant when he proposed 
that the crucial property of an autonomous system is its operational closure. 
In an autonomous system, every constituent process is conditioned by some 
other process in the system; hence, if we analyse the enabling conditions for 
any constituent process of the system, we will always be led to other pro-
cesses in the system. (Thompson and Stapleton 2009: 24.)
It is in the third condition presented above (that the processes “deter-
mine a domain of possible interactions with the world”) that we see the 
second key way that the example of the bacterium is supposed to help us 
understand the enactive approach to cognition. It is through the system’s 
own activity of generating and maintaining itself that it transforms the 
world into an environment for itself. In the case of the bacterium, it is the 
activity of generating and maintaining the metabolism of the cell that 
determines what things in the world are relevant to it. Sugar is needed by 
the cell to drive these metabolic processes, and so it has value for the cell 
in terms of being relevant to its continuing self-maintenance and produc-
tion. Things that are poisonous to the cell because they will disrupt its 
metabolic processes in some way have dis-value for the cell, so they are 
also relevant to its continuing self-maintenance and production. Bacteria, 
like us, do not typically exist in a world in which all those things that have 
 M. STAPLETON
167
value for it are provided, and all those that have dis-value for it are kept 
away. To survive, they must adapt by either making changes to their inter-
nal structure or making changes to the world by means of moving around 
in it to get to a place that better provides the things it needs. In this way, 
it is the structure of the autonomous system (here instantiated in the auto-
poietic organisation of a living bacterium) and the way that it adapts to 
changes that are relevant for the continuation of that system that deter-
mines what parts of the world will be interacted with, and therefore make 
up its environment. This activity of the system that relates it to parts of the 
world is referred to as sense-making. It is the system enacting a world of 
sense, that is, a world of relevance or value to itself.
The example of bacterial sense-making is an example of the extreme of 
the bottom-up approach to understanding cognition. Many people (even 
within the extended and enactive approaches) resist the idea that bacteria 
are cognitive, or even that what is described is “proto-cognitive”. For the 
autopoietic enactivist, the example is important however, because (i) it 
demonstrates the enacting of a world as a result of an instantiation of an 
adaptively autonomous organisation at the level of the most basic form of 
life, and (ii) it brings to the fore the activities of the organism—even very 
simple organisms—in relation to its environment. These sense-making 
activities “transform the world into a place of salience, meaning, and 
value—into an environment (Umwelt) in the proper biological sense of 
the term.” (Thompson and Stapleton 2009: 25)
Evan Thompson expresses these key points clearly in the introduction 
to the recent revised edition of The Embodied Mind.
what is meant by “body,” for the enactive approach, is not the body as a 
functional system defined in terms of inputs and outputs—as it is for func-
tionalist cognitive science—but rather the body as an adaptively autono-
mous and sense-making system. An adaptively autonomous system is one 
that generates and maintains itself through constant structural and func-
tional change (like a living cell), and in so doing brings forth or enacts rel-
evance. In being a self-individuating system, it is also a sense-making one, 
and in being a sense-making system, it is also a self-individuating one. 
Cognition and world are interdependently originated via the living body.” 
(Varela et al. 2017; xxvi)
a cognitive being’s world is not a pre-specified, external realm, represented 
internally by its brain, but is rather a relational domain enacted or brought 
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forth by that being in and through its mode of coupling with the environ-
ment.” (ibid., “Introduction”, p. xxvii)
It is this relational domain that I am primarily concerned with in this 
chapter: the transformation of the world into an Umwelt in virtue of the 
coupling between a system and the world, a transformation that is enabled 
by the system’s sensory and motor capacities. Enactivism places great 
weight on demonstrating how this activity of enacting a relational domain 
emerges from autonomous, adaptive organisation—an organisation that is 
instantiated in a physical system. It is thus a deeply embodied approach; 
the body is fundamental to cognition from the bottom-up. And this deep 
embodiment will shape all the processes and activities that the system can 
engage in, enabling some and constraining others.
Other approaches that come under the enactive and extended banners 
often share this commitment to embodiment and the enaction of a rela-
tional domain between an organism and its world even if they do not take 
inspiration from the notions of autonomy and adaptivity. For some, the 
paradigmatic example of the bacterium in a sugar gradient is just too bot-
tom- up, and they struggle to see the commonalities between sense- making 
at this level and human cognition. The autopoietic enactivist is of course 
not committed to viewing the bacterium as experiencing the value that 
things in its environment have for it. Nor, to viewing the bacterium to be 
purposefully regulating its coupling with the environment, where “pur-
poseful” is understood in the terms we normally use it—as implying some 
kind of reflection on a goal state and striving to achieve that goal state by 
behaving in a way in which one could have done otherwise.12 Nevertheless, 
it is admittedly difficult to see how these aspects of human-level cognition 
can scale up from such a minimal form of sense-making and thus to use the 
bacterium example as more than an analogy. (Indeed, exploring ways in 
which this might be done is part of the enactivist project). In order there-
fore to not alienate those who do not find the autopoietic example and the 
sense-making of bacterium motivating—or who even might find it a hin-
drance to engaging with the enactive view—it is helpful for us to look to 
other examples of world-making which demonstrate the activity of enact-
ing a world of value at a slightly higher level than the bacterial, examples 
of creatures that are not only multicellular but that have organs of 
12 See (Weber and Varela 2002) for an extended discussion of the notion of teleology and 
its applicability to the enactive project.
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perception and various means of moving around in the world. It is at this 
level that we start to see a consensus between different strands of the 
extended and enactive communities in their understanding of the rela-
tional domain that is enacted by organisms through their activity.
4  relatIonal Worlds
Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory has served as a unifying inspiration13 
for many of the proponents of the various approaches that come under the 
banner of extended, enactive, embodied, and embedded cognition (“4E” 
cognition). Von Uexküll’s essay from 1934, “A Stroll Through the Worlds 
of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds,” is a playful 
exploration of the perceptual worlds of different animals (Von Uexküll 
1934/1992). Writing partly in a literary—almost poetic—style and some-
times in prose that reads more like a text-book in physiology, it is an 
incongruous but delightful piece of writing that has inspired generations 
of scientists and philosophers. The essay starts:
This little monograph does not claim to point the way to a new science. 
Perhaps it should be called a stroll into unfamiliar worlds; worlds strange to 
us but known to other creatures, manifold and varied as the animals them-
selves. The best time to set out on such an adventure is on a sunny day. The 
place, a flower-strewn meadow, humming with insects, fluttering with but-
terflies. Here we may glimpse the worlds of the lowly dwellers of the 
meadow. To do so, we must first blow, in fancy, a soap bubble around each 
creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions which it 
alone knows. When we ourselves then step into one of these bubbles, the 
familiar meadow is transformed. Many of its colourful features disappear, 
others no longer belong together but appear in new relationships. A new 
world comes into being. Through the bubble we see the world of the bur-
rowing worm, of the butterfly, or of the field mouse: the world as it appears 
to the animals themselves, not as it appears to us. This we may call the phe-
nomenal world or the self-world of the animal. (Ibid: 319)
13 See,, for example Andy Clark’s Being There (Clark 1997) and Tony Chemero’s review 
(Chemero 1998), as well as (Thompson 2007). See also (Vörös 2017) for connections to 
Varela’s thought and (Ziemke and Sharkey 2001) for applications to Artificial Intelligence 
and robotics.
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The work is at the same time both self-consciously playful (the subtitle 
of the essay after all reads “A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds”) and ear-
nestly radical. Von Uexküll is explicitly reacting against what he calls the 
“mechanistic theorists”. These are the theorists who look at animals as 
made up solely of tools to perceive and tools to act “connected by an inte-
grating apparatus which, though still a mechanism, is yet fit to carry on the 
life functions” (Ibid: 320). The expression of this approach in the study of 
humans was captured by the behaviourism of the time. While that kind of 
behaviourism is unpopular nowadays, a close relative of these primitive 
mechanistic theories—functionalism—has become the default approach in 
the cognitive sciences. And, it seems to be not at all uncommon—and 
perhaps the norm—to think about simpler creatures and insects in these 
mechanistic terms, even if creatures judged as more intelligent (primates, 
corvids, etc.) are generally considered to be more than mere biological 
clockworks.
Von Uexküll rejects this mechanistic picture of creatures, arguing that 
there is more to organisms than their mechanical structure: “there is also 
the operator, who is built into their organs, as we are into our bodies” 
(p. 6). This is not a bid to seek out a homunculus or put a ghost in the 
machine. Rather, it is a prompt for us to see the subjectivity inherent in the 
very activity of perceiving and acting. And in this way, “[w]e thus unlock 
the gates that lead to other realms, for all that a subject perceives becomes 
his perceptual world and all that he does, his effector world. Perceptual 
and effector worlds together form a closed unit, the Umwelt” (Ibid).
Although Umwelt translates literally from German into English as 
“environment,” we must be careful not to conflate the two terms. Von 
Uexküll uses “the environment” to refer to the world that the creature 
finds itself in, whereas its Umwelt is its world; the world that it senses and 
acts in from its perspective.14 The Umwelt of a butterfly in my garden then 
is quite different to my Umwelt, despite our sharing an environment. To 
prompt an understanding in us of the radically different worlds of the 
animals in the environment, von Uexküll invites the reader to join him and 
“ramble through these worlds of wonder” (Von Uexküll 1934/1992: 
14 Recently, there has been some work done to unpack the notion of Umwelt, how it relates 
to the concept of environment, and how these fit with affordance approaches. I am using 
these terms in the most general sense that they are presented in this work. The reader who is 
interested in more fine-grained distinctions and their implications is directed towards (Baggs 
and Chemero 2018, 2020) and (Feiten 2020).
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320). The first of these worlds of wonder, and the one most often cited, 
probably because its world is so dramatically different to ours in virtue of 
its simplicity and security, is that of the tick.
The tick is an intriguing animal for understanding how other organisms 
experience the world because it seems to be sensitive to the world in only 
three ways: its skin is photosensitive, it has receptors for butyric acid which 
is released from the skin glands of mammals, and it can sense the warmth 
of a mammal’s warm blood. Von Uexküll writes:
From the egg there issues forth a small animal, not yet fully developed, for 
it lacks a pair of legs and sex organs. In this state it is already capable of 
attacking cold-blooded animals, such as lizards, whom it waylays as it sits on 
the tip of a blade of grass. After shedding its skin several times, it acquires 
the missing organs, mates, and starts its hunt for warm-blooded animals.
After mating, the female climbs to the tip of a twig on some bush. There she 
clings at such a height that she can drop upon small mammals that may run 
under her, or be brushed off by larger animals.
The eyeless tick is directed to this watchtower by a general photosensitivity 
of her skin. The approaching prey is revealed to the blind and deaf highway 
woman by her sense of smell. The odor of butyric acid, that emanates from 
the skin glands of all mammals, acts on the tick as a signal to leave her watch-
tower and hurl herself downwards. If, in so doing, she lands on something 
warm—a fine sense of temperature betrays this to her—she has reached her 
prey, the warm-blooded creature. It only remains for her to find a hairless 
spot. There she burrows deep into the skin of her prey, and slowly pumps 
herself full of warm blood. (Ibid: 321)
It is the fact that the tick has receptors for these aspects of the environ-
ment that allow her to respond to them, but it is likewise that the tick has 
these receptors that enable those aspects of the environment to be cues for 
her. Another way of phrasing this is that “[w]hat we are dealing with is not 
an exchange of forces between two objects, but the relations between a 
living subject and its object.” (Ibid: 325). For von Uexküll, Umwelten 
then are unashamedly relational. The organism is related to its environ-
ment in virtue of the organism’s perceptual and effector capacities. What 
this means is that what perception is, or rather what its perceptual world is 
made up out of, is the relation-in-action of the organism with those aspects 
of the environment which its particular sensory systems enable it to be in 
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contact with. This relationality of perception that we see by looking at 
creatures in terms of their Umwelts is important. It reveals first and fore-
most that an organism already finds itself in a meaningful world, a world 
that has value to it in terms of what it can sense and what it can do in it. 
The tick is not thrown into a world devoid of value which it has to some-
how represent and make complex computations to find its way around in 
and survive. It does not have to select what may be useful to it from that 
which is not relevant to its survival. Rather, it is thrown into a world that 
already has meaning for it. It is born able to sense and respond to those 
things that will enable it to continue its existence. Outside the realm of 
stimuli which the tick has receptors for, it does not perceive. Perception 
for it is the relation between that part of the world that it is sensitive to and 
its bodily sensing of that.
Although this story of the tick’s perceptual/effectual world might seem 
a far cry from the human case, von Uexküll absolutely wants us to acknowl-
edge that it is not only animals but humans as well that have Umwelten, 
and indeed that individual humans have individual Umwelten.15 Humans 
are of course sensitive to many more (and of course different) things than 
ticks are, and so our worlds are bigger than other animals. But they do not 
necessarily subsume these smaller worlds. We cannot, for example, just 
bracket off the parts of the world that the tick is not sensitive to and then 
experience the world as a tick would because we are not (typically) very 
sensitive to, for example, butyric acid. Nor do we have the particular effec-
tor organs that ticks do. But a key similarity between us and other animals 
concerns our particular bodies, how they are set up with sensory receptors 
and how effector organs determine the parts of the world that we will be 
sensitive to, and in what way we will be sensitive to them.
5  affordances and values
Von Uexküll’s stroll into the Umwelt of the tick illustrates the meaningful-
ness of the world for evolved organisms. All organisms have parts of the 
world they are sensitive to and in which they can act. The set of those parts 
of the world afford possibilities for action to the animal. We can see then 
15 See (Von Uexküll 1934/1992: 339). Note however that there can be shared elements in 
each individual Umwelt so he does not necessarily relegate us to living in isolated solipsistic 
worlds—a conclusion that would certainly be at odds with embodied-extended-enactive 
approaches to the mind.
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that parts of the world that afford a particular action to one animal may 
not be the same as those for another animal.16 The presence of butyric acid 
does not afford anything to me even though it affords dropping (onto the 
mammal exuding it) for the tick. Similarly, although some parts of the 
world may afford possibilities for several types of organism, these affor-
dances may be different in kind. A standard kitchen chair affords sitting on 
to me, walking under to my cat, landing on to a fly, and perhaps jumping 
onto for a child in the throes of playing “the floor is lava”.
This concept of affordances comes from the psychologist J.J. Gibson in 
his landmark book The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Gibson 
1979/2015). Like von Uexküll, Gibson was a scientist who was also 
strongly influenced by philosophy, in particular the radical empiricism of 
William James and the phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty, 
who himself of course was strongly influenced by Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Sartre.17 And, like von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelts, Gibson’s con-
cept of affordances has fed back in to philosophy, in particular having a 
great influence on extended and enactive approaches to perception and 
cognition. Gibson defined affordances as follows:
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in 
the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by 
it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way 
that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and 
the environment. (Gibson 1979/2015: 119)
16 Note however that Gibson resists identifying a niche with the phenomenal world of an 
animal because affordances are for him not merely subjective phenomena. And indeed, some 
of Von Uexküll’s comments indicate that he holds a Kantian position whereby the real world 
beyond the phenomenal world cannot be known. However, the notion of Umwelts does not 
necessitate having this distinction between the phenomenal and objective world. We can read 
them in light of the idea of sense-making outlined earlier as both being subjective in terms of 
being enacted and thereby being a perspective, and at the same time being aspects of the 
world that can be shared—and thus in this sense are objective.
17 A great resource for the connections between the psychologists and the phenomenolo-
gists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is (Käufer and Chemero 2015). An 
introduction to phenomenology aimed at cognitive science students.
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While this part of the definition is often cited, it is worth seeing the rest 
of the paragraph in which it occurs to see how he emphasises the relational 
nature of affordances18:
If a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal (instead of slanted), nearly flat 
(instead of convex or concave), and sufficiently extended (relative to the size 
of the animal) and if its substance is rigid (relative to the weight of the ani-
mal), then the surface affords support. It is a surface of support, and we call 
it a substratum, ground, or floor. It is stand-on-able, permitting an upright 
posture for quadrupeds and bipeds. It is therefore walk-on-able and run- 
over- able. It is not sink-into-able like a surface of water or a swamp, that is, 
not for heavy terrestrial animals. Support for water bugs is different.
Note that the four properties listed—horizontal, flat, extended, and rigid—
would be physical properties of a surface if they were measured with the 
scales and standard units used in physics. As an affordance of support for a 
species of animal, however, they have to be measured relative to the animal. 
They are unique for that animal. They are not just abstract physical proper-
ties. They have unity relative to the posture and behavior of the animal 
being considered. So an affordance cannot be measured as we measure in 
physics. (Gibson 1979/2015: 119–120)
This talk of affordances being relative to the animal might make us 
worry that he is proposing a relativistic theory inasmuch as these proper-
ties are present only relative to a particular animal and are therefore sub-
jective. This suspicion might be heightened by the explicit declaration that 
the theory of affordances “implies that the “values” and “meanings” of 
things in the environment can be directly perceived” (Ibid: 119). It is 
indeed the case that affordances that are perceived are relative to an animal 
but what this means is that “to perceive the world is to co-perceive one-
self” (Ibid: 113). That is, that one perceives what one can do in-and-with 
the environment. We should not interpret the relationality of organism 
and world in the enacting of worlds or the perceiving of affordances as the 
construction of a subjective world in some idealist sense of the term. There 
are values and subjectivity, but these are not separate from the world; they 
are enacted in the relation between the animal and its environment. As 
Gibson puts it: “an affordance is neither an objective property nor a 




subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the 
dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inade-
quacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is 
both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, 
to the environment and to the observer” (Ibid: 121).
Affordances and their values to the observer should be understood as 
“properties of things taken with reference to an observer but not properties 
of the observer” (Ibid: 129). So while they are relational, they are not rela-
tivistic. They are real things in a real world and can be shared by others. 
Nevertheless, they have the values and opportunities for action that they 
have for a particular animal at a particular time in virtue of the bodily capa-
bilities and needs of that animal. An affordance is objective in that it could 
be perceived by another animal with appropriate bodily capabilities, but 
the affordances that are actually perceived by a particular animal at a par-
ticular time are those that are relevant to its needs (p. 130). We can see 
therefore that, in common with the enactivist concept of sense-making 
and von Uexküll's Umwelts, perception for Gibson is value-laden from the 
bottom-up:
The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free 
physical object to which meaning is somehow added in a way that no one 
has been able to agree upon; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecologi-
cal object. Any substance, any surface, any layout has some affordance for 
benefit or injury to someone. Physics may be value-free, but ecology is not. 
(Ibid: 131–132).
6  affordances and nIches
Much of Gibson’s exploration of the idea of affordances consists in show-
ing how animals can perceive opportunities for behaviour in virtue of the 
way that light is structured differently when it is reflected off surfaces. This 
was a radical innovation in psychology as it provided a means to explain 
how animals can pick up visual information directly. This means that they 
can be understood as perceiving by directly responding to structural dif-
ferences in their environment. For example, the light they can perceive 
from their physical point of view is structured in a particular way as a result 
of both the surfaces near them and their position in space relative to those 
surfaces. I perceive the chair in virtue of the way light rays are reflected off 
it. The angles of those rays will depend on where I am standing and how 
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tall I am. The outcome of this is that the “information” that is picked up 
is “out there” in the environment. There is thus no need to represent the 
chair “in my head” and compute what actions I can take upon it. Rather, 
the actions that I can take upon it are already specified in the light that I 
am perceiving and are different for me and for a toddler. I perceive the 
chair (in virtue of the angles of the light that it reflects) as sit-on-able, 
whereas the toddler—for whom the angles of the light merely specify plac-
ing things on at arm height—may perceive it as put-things-on-able.
There is a great deal of research in ecological psychology and the phi-
losophy of cognitive science that debates how we should conceive of affor-
dances, how we should understand direct perception, and the notion of 
information at play in Gibson.19 For our purposes here, however, it will 
suffice to use the term “affordances” broadly as it often is in the extended 
and enactive literature. This broad sense captures both the gist of Gibsonian 
affordances and the enactive concept of sense-making. It is, for example, a 
key aspect that the way my body is shaped allows me to perceive some-
thing as having certain affordances. Something that is step-on-able to me 
is so because I have legs that are shaped in a particular way, can move at 
particular angles, and are a particular length/height. It is not perceived as 
step-on-able by a toddler or a snake. It should be clear that all of the key 
concepts discussed so far—sense-making, Umwelts, and affordances—are 
ways of investigating and cashing out the organism–environment system 
in terms of the relations between the organism and the environment. The 
key difference between the ecological psychology project and the enactive 
project that is relevant here is that ecological psychologists place greater 
weight on investigating the structures in the environment that the organ-
ism couples with, whereas enactivists emphasise the organismic processes 
that make this coupling possible (Stapleton 2016; Baggs and Chemero 
2018, 2020). But as we have seen above, Gibson was also clearly con-
cerned with what the organism brings to the affordance relation in respect 
to both physical capacities and the values that emerge.
Using the notion of affordances as broadly construed in this way then, 
we can take some liberties with it and connect it with von Uexküll’s con-
cept of Umwelt.20 The key takeaways from both—as broadly 
19 Some accessible introductions for philosophers to these issues are in (Chemero 2003, 
2009); (Käufer and Chemero 2015); (McGann 2014); and (Baggs and Chemero 2018).
20 Strictly speaking, von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory and Gibsonian affordances may not be 
compatible. For example, von Uexküll meant his theory to be constructivist in the tradition 
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construed—are this: (1) what we perceive is dependent in important ways 
on what we can do, indeed on what we are doing; (2) our physical make 
up (both physiological and morphological) opens the space for what we 
can do and perceive; and (3) our worlds (read Umwelts) are made up of 
the possibilities for action (affordances) available to us and are therefore 
worlds of value. On this way of thinking, the world is not something that 
is perceived and then acted upon. Rather it is something that is attuned to 
and acted in accordance with.
We must distinguish between the affordances that we perceive at a par-
ticular time that have value for us based on our current needs, and the 
affordances that are available to be perceived by us if we had the need. 
This latter set of affordances are what Gibson refers to as a niche:
Ecologists have the concept of a niche. A species of animal is said to utilize 
or occupy a certain niche in the environment. This is not quite the same as 
the habitat of the species; a niche refers more to how an animal lives than to 
where it lives. I suggest that a niche is a set of affordances.
The natural environment offers many ways of life, and different animals have 
different ways of life. The niche implies a kind of animal, and the animal 
implies a kind of niche. Note the complementarity of the two. But note also 
that the environment as a whole with its unlimited possibilities existed prior 
to animals. (Gibson 1979/2015: 120)
Even though von Uexküll presents his Umwelt theory in terms of phe-
nomenal worlds, it is really this idea of a niche implied by each animal in 
virtue of what the animal can perceive and do in the world that is evident. 
of Kant, whereas Gibson’s approach was unambiguously realist. There has begun to be a 
stream of literature that concerns itself with setting out these differences (and the differences 
with each and the enactive paradigm) and considering whether the approaches can be coher-
ently connected. See, for example, some of the contributions to the recent Frontiers in 
Psychology Research Topic on “Enaction and Ecological Psychology: Convergences and 
Complementarities” https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/10973/enaction-and-
ecological-psychology-convergences-and-complementarities#overview, especially: (Corris 
2020); (Feiten 2020); and (Crippen 2020), as well as (Baggs and Chemero 2018, 2020). For 
our purposes, these details don’t matter. I am concerned with the way that the notions of 
Umwelt and affordances were being used in the extended and enactive literatures in order to 
engender a certain way of thinking about the mind and the world (that I consider all of the 
above authors to share) that is distinct from the way of thinking pervasive in the cognitivist 
paradigm.
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An animal’s phenomenal world is a time-slice of its engagement with an 
aspect of its niche. For the tick, of course, its Umwelt is so small that it may 
be identical with its niche. The tick’s world is so utterly secure that it does 
not have competing affordances to deal with. And its niche is completely 
made up of biological imperatives; if it senses butyric acid, then it will drop 
onto the mammal exuding it, otherwise it will stay where it is. At the other 
end of the spectrum, we humans live in a world in which we are presented 
with a huge array of possibilities for action, some of which are biological 
imperatives, and some of which are possibilities in the more modal sense 
of the term. A chair, for example, affords sitting on but unless I have a 
specific neurological disorder that makes me compulsively respond to 
affordances,21 I do not automatically sit on every chair I see. The parts of 
the world around me that afford action vary in soliciting my behaviour 
depending on my needs in the moment. When I am thirsty, a glass of water 
will solicit drinking, whereas when I am overwhelmed with disgust, it may 
not. For creatures like us however, affordances are not merely possibilities 
for action that respond to some immediate physiological imperative. How 
can we understand this from a bottom-up perspective?
One way to think about this is in terms of how organisms affect their 
niches. A tick does not make any changes to its niche which stays stable 
throughout its life cycle unless, for example, its carrying of something like 
Lyme disease were to result in its wiping out its food source. Other ani-
mals however enter into a coupling relationship with their worlds 
whereby—intentionally or not—they regulate that coupling. One oft- 
cited example is how beavers construct the environments in which they fit. 
By changing the landscape around them, they make that landscape more 
suited to their lives; the activity of their gnawing down trees and con-
structing dams changes the possibilities for action that are available to 
them. These changes also have an effect on the larger ecosystem in which 
they live, which then of course spirals back and changes the world in which 
they find themselves. Beavers literally construct their own niches. This 
phenomenon is not unique to beavers however, we can see similar behav-
iours in much simpler creatures such as ants and termites. In his landmark 
book on Extended Cognition Being There, Andy Clark gives a detailed 
example of how the tendency of some species of termite to roll mud balls 
and to deposit them near each other as a result of the chemical traces left 
on them results in their building of grand termite mounds (Clark 1997). 
21 This neurological disorder is called “utilization behaviour”. See (Lhermitte 1983).
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This is an example of stigmergy: complex behaviour emerging from the 
self-organisation of organisms following simple cues that they lay down 
themselves.
The point is not that termites and beavers purposefully construct their 
own habitats. On the contrary, the interesting thing is that there does not 
need to be a purposeful construction. Niche construction is not niche 
building in the way that we build houses. It is the emergence of new affor-
dance structures as a result of changes in the environment that the activity 
of the organism brings about. But as simple as this construction might be 
in that it does not require any particular intelligent planning to bring it 
about, it nevertheless opens up the world to the organism. It is no longer 
restricted to the biological imperatives of the Umwelt in which it was 
thrown into as a newborn. The construction of the niche expands this 
Umwelt. It is now an Umwelt+. The possibilities for action afforded to our 
termites (and thus their perceptual worlds at any particular time) have now 
increased as a result of the mound that has arisen around them in virtue of 
their own activity.
7  constructIng InstItutIonal Worlds
Animals change their environments. The termites discussed in the previ-
ous section actively (even if unwittingly) construct a new environment for 
themselves through their activity. The new termite mound in which they 
live and interact makes available new and different affordances for the 
group. Humans excel at changing their environments, and thus changing 
what that environment affords them. We know that this can of course be 
done by intentionally making changes to the structures of the environ-
ment. And, if we take a top-down, cognitivist perspective we might think 
that this is the principal means by which we change our worlds and con-
struct new physical and cognitive environments in which to live. Taking a 
bottom-up perspective, however, can give us a rather different view on this 
process. Andy Clark, for example, has argued that our human-level cul-
tural successes are partly a result of something akin to the stigmergic algo-
rithms that we see in evidence in the termite community:
Stigmergy, recall, involves the use of external structures to control, prompt, 
and coordinate individual actions. Such external structures can themselves 
be acted upon and thus mold future behaviors in turn. In the case of termite 
nest building, the actions of individual termites were controlled by local nest 
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structure yet often involved modifications of that structure which in turn 
prompted further activity by the same or other individuals. Humans, even 
when immersed in the constraining environments of large social political or 
economical institutions, are, of course, not termites! Unlike the termite, we 
will not always perform an action simply because an external prompt seems 
to demand it. However, our collective successes (and sometimes our collec-
tive failures) may often be best understood by seeing the individual as 
choosing his or her responses only within the often powerful constraints 
imposed by the broader social and institutional contexts of action. And this, 
indeed, is just what we should expect once we recognize that the computa-
tional nature of individual cognition is not ideally suited to the negotiation 
of certain types of complex domains. In these cases, it would seem, we solve 
the problem (e.g. building a jumbo jet or running a country) only indi-
rectly—by creating larger external structures, both physical and social, 
which can then prompt and coordinate a long sequence of individually trac-
table episodes of problem solving, preserving and transmitting partial solu-
tions along the way. (Clark 1997: 186)
Clark refers to this tendency that humans have as “stigmergic self- 
modulation”. Humans excel at creating self-stimulating loops in which 
they change the kinds of stimulation/affordances available to them.22 This 
can happen either on an individual or a collective level. One of the most 
impressive examples of this at the individual level is that of the dolphin and 
tuna, who are able to manoeuvre quicker than they should be able to given 
the capacities of their bodies.23 They seem to be able to do this by exploit-
ing the dynamics available in the water. Where rocks form eddies or vorti-
ces in the water, they use these to then push off from, rather like a human 
swimmer using the side of a swimming pool to push off when doing 
lengths. But, and this is where the idea of self-stimulation comes in, they 
also seem to create eddies and vortices in the water themselves through 
their own movements and then use these—self-generated—environmental 
structures to push off from. They have generated a new set of possibilities 
for action through their own action.
In the human-realm we see this self-stimulating activity in what have 
been labelled “epistemic actions”.24 Epistemic actions differ from 
22 See his book Natural Born Cyborgs (Clark 2003) for an extended exploration of this.
23 (Triantafyllou and Triantafyllou 1995) cited in (Clark 1997). See especially (Clark 1997, 
ch. 11) for discussion of the tuna.




“pragmatic” actions which are actions taken to change a part of the world 
in order to achieve a physical goal. Simple tool use in animals is an example 
of pragmatic actions. The chimp licks the stick and pokes it in the termite 
mound to reach the termites so it can eat them. Or, a captive honey bad-
ger moves stones to the corner of a wall so that it can use them to climb 
up, over, and escape. Epistemic actions on the other hand don’t have a 
physical goal but rather an epistemic goal. The idea is that by changing the 
world in certain ways we are able to then engage with it in ways that are 
simple and straightforward (much like the termite stigmergy) rather than 
having to represent the problem space internally and perform complex 
computations over these representations. In this way, an epistemic action 
is a world-involving loop that is a constituent part of an animals cognitive 
process. Kirsch and Maglio’s key example of this is their study of how 
advanced players of the game Tetris physically rotate the zoids as they are 
descending. We might assume that mental rotation of the zoids to see 
where they would best fit in the line that needs completing would be 
quicker than physically manipulating the controller to change their orien-
tation on the screen. However, it turns out that actually the physical rota-
tion of the zoids enables the player to better determine where it would fit 
within the time frame. Another simple example of epistemic action con-
cerns the use of Scrabble tiles.25 An expert player typically will not simply 
place his set of tiles in the holder and then mentally run through the per-
mutations of the letters to come up with the set of words that they can 
form. Rather, they move the tiles around in the holder, changing their 
positions and setting them up in such a way that it is easier for their brain 
to perform pattern completion on the letters and come up with words.
Andy Clark predominantly talks about these kinds of environmental 
manipulations as transforming problem spaces. But, it should be clear 
that—in line with Gibson—what these environmental manipulations do is 
change what the environment affords us. And in the case of epistemic 
actions, their very purpose is to realise different affordances that will allow 
us to further cognitively engage with (and therefore solve) a task. This 
continuity between the natural environment offering affordances, the 
man-modified environment offering affordances, and the cultural envi-
ronment is already pressed by Gibson in his chapter on the “Theory of 
Affordances” (Gibson 1979/2015). The examples of epistemic action 
given above are those in which the agent has intentionally made changes 
25 Also from Kirsch and cited in (Clark 1997).
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to their environment in order to modify the problem space. However, this 
is not a necessary element of an epistemic action. We might happen upon 
the method of rotating zoids, or scrabble tiles, and habitually use it even if 
we do not realise that it is our doing this that makes the problem easier to 
solve (knowing only that it does allow it to be solved). Similarly, a small 
child might imitate an older player by moving their scrabble tiles around 
in their holder without knowing why they are doing it (in the way that a 
toddler imitates a parent by sitting with a newspaper on their lap “read-
ing” it, before they can actually read). Nevertheless, these actions can still 
play the epistemic role of simplifying the problem space opening it up to 
interacting with in a more stigmergic-like fashion. Much of our culture is 
like this. We might habitually run the cold tap when pouring the boiling 
water from the pasta into the sink because those we have learned to cook 
from have always done this, without realising why this is done. Nevertheless, 
it is effective. Of course, an awareness of the role that these actions play in 
modifying our environment so as to reshape our problem space provides 
opportunities for us to construct new epistemic actions to accomplish 
these goals even more efficiently or to accomplish other goals. However, 
these new possibilities for epistemic action are not only not always con-
structed intentionally, they are also not necessarily transmitted intention-
ally. They can be inherited as part of the cultural background that sits 
unquestioned.
The examples of rotating zoids and rearranging scrabble tiles are also of 
course epistemic actions pitched at the individual level. But as I indicated 
above, these actions and their epistemic consequences do not necessarily 
die with the original actor. They can be culturally inherited, and in many 
cases can better be understood as a culturally constructed niche (see 
Sterelny 2010). Kim Sterelny has argued exactly this: that epistemic action 
is a form of niche construction and that this niche construction has cross- 
generational effects. His proposed model is of “environmentally- scaffolded 
cognition”, which he distinguishes from Andy Clark’s Extended Mind 
model (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998). Sterelny argues that “the most 
compelling and plausible cases for the extended mind hypothesis are limit-
ing special cases of scaffolded minds” (Sterelny 2010: 463). Nevertheless, 
Sterelny’s proposal fits coherently with many of the ideas proposed by 
Clark (1997) and which often appear under the banner of “Extended 
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Cognition”.26 The environment “scaffolds” cognition in the Vygotskian 
sense that it provides support for learning something that might not oth-
erwise be able to be easily learned (or perhaps learned at all). A simple 
example of this is counting on our fingers or using an abacus to perform 
more complex calculations. In the case of counting on our fingers, this 
scaffolding is usually thrown away once counting has been mastered. But 
the abacus may not be; it may be retained to use as scaffolding in future 
cases, so the scaffolding is not merely for learning but also for doing. In 
this way, environmental scaffolding is a part and parcel of our cognitive 
activities. But the idea of scaffolding should not be reduced to mere tool- 
use. The idea is that we are embedded in layers upon layers of scaffolding, 
some of which we have inherited and some of which we create ourselves. 
Our cognitive activities are therefore at no time separable out from the 
scaffolding in which they are taking place. And, scaffolded in this way, 
much of our seemingly very complex behaviour is explainable in terms 
much akin to the kind of stigmergy encountered with our trusty termites.
One great example of this kind of distributed, scaffolded, cognitive sys-
tem is the way that Elizabethan actors putting on performances of 
Shakespeare’s plays were able to play a huge number of different roles at 
any one time, as well as constantly learning new roles (Tribble 2005).27 
The puzzle was not only how they managed to commit so many roles to 
memory (itself an enormous task) but how they managed to do so when 
they were not given full copies of the scripts. They were only given access 
to pared-down copies detailing their entrance cues and minimal plot maps. 
It would therefore seem unlikely that the internalisation of all of the scripts 
would have been the means by which they accomplished this task even if 
the actors had indeed had superior memory abilities. As John Sutton 
writes in respect to this proposal: “Roughly, the Globe’s artifacts worked 
to get the actors to the right place at the right time for further local 
26 We can distinguish here between debates about the “Extended Mind” thesis which con-
cern the best way of metaphysically individuating cognitive states and discussions of 
“Extended Cognition” which concern the dynamic loops between brain, body, and world 
that constitute many of our cognitive activities. It is the latter that is consistent with Sterelny’s 
approach.
27 Cited and summarised in (Sutton 2010). See also (Sterelny 2010) for his discussion of 
this in respect to the extended mind thesis.
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environmental alterations (such as a particular line or event on stage) to 
call forth spontaneously the required specific behavior”28 (Sutton 
2010: 203).
Although the behaviour that emerges—the performance and produc-
tion of many, many plays—is highly complex and dynamic, and arguably a 
clear instance of higher-level cultural cognition, we nevertheless should 
see the connection here to the stigmergy discussed above. The structured 
environment carries much of the “information” so that the individual 
actors do not need to. The inherited performance “niche” affords certain 
possibilities for the actors and constrains others. As the interactional 
dynamics of their responding to cues unfolds, their very actions change 
the space of affordances available to them and their fellow actors, con-
stantly constructing and co-creating their collective environment.
This line of reasoning has been pushed even further into the sociocul-
tural realm by Gallagher and Crisafi who have argued that we can use the 
extended mind framework to understand how social institutions function. 
Their prime example is of the legal system which they refer to as a “mental 
institution” due to its cognitive nature. They write:
The legal process is a cognitive one—it is cognition producing, insofar as it 
produces judgments—and cognition produced, in the sense that it is the 
product of many (and perhaps generations of) cognizers, although it is not 
reducible to simply the cognitive processes that occurred in their individual 
heads. The practice of law, which is highly cognitive (and communicative), 
is carried out via the cooperation of many people relying on external (and 
conventional) cognitive schemas and rules of evidence provided in part by 
the legal institution itself; it depends on a large and complex system, an 
institution, without which it could not happen. It is a cognitive practice that 
in principle could not happen just in the head; indeed, it extends cognition 
through environments that are large and various. (Gallagher and 
Crisafi 2009: 48)
We might think about the creation, maintenance, and use of these so- 
called mental institutions as collective epistemic actions that take place 
28 Sutton here directs the reader to Andy Clark’s discussion of Edwin Hutchins’ “distrib-
uted cognition” model (Clark 1997, p. 76). “Distributed cognition” is a close relative of 
extended views but instead of making claims about the constitution or location of cognition, 




over generations. They are cultural niches, created and engaged with 
partly through stigmergy and partly through intentional construction. 
They provide a constrained set of possibilities for action for individuals, 
but the dynamics of this engagement that emerges constitutes highly com-
plex cognition and behaviour.
We can think of this collective construction of the environments in 
which we and our descendants grow up within as an example of an 
Umwelt+. Unlike the case of the simple Umwelt of the tick, we are of 
course not born into this Umwelt+ able to perceive and engage with all 
aspects of it. We have to learn about some of the affordances, both physi-
cal and epistemic. And in the process we lay down new stigmergic trails, 
create new possibilities for action and thought, new scaffolds to engage 
with. These scaffolds are ones that are set up (in virtue of their being 
inherited) to be relevant to our needs, and thereby have value for us. We 
use them to make sense of the world. It is a cycle of constructing an envi-
ronment through acting in relation to those aspects of the world that are 
relevant to us and thereby laying down new scaffolds for ourselves and 
others. In this way, we can start to see how bottom-up approaches to per-
ception and cognition may contain the seeds to understand how some 
very high-level complex cognition and behaviour can come about.
8  conclusIon
The purpose of this chapter has been to walk readers unfamiliar with the 
literature in extended and enactive cognitive science through a selection of 
the ways in which perception and cognition are seen to be world-involving 
on these approaches. It is my hope that even such a brief introduction to 
some of the various contents of the extended and enactive conceptual 
toolkit can generate in the reader an insight into a way of thinking that is 
shared by many of those who do research under the broad banner of 
“extended cognition” or who take inspiration from it. It is of course by no 
means the case that all those who identify as extended cognition research-
ers or enactive cognition researchers embrace all of the approaches I have 
outlined here. Nevertheless, the concepts of sense-making, Umwelts, 
affordances, cultural niches, epistemic actions, environmental scaffolding, 
and mental institutions/the socially extended mind are all ways of express-
ing the world-involvingness of cognition and emphasise different aspects 
of this world-involvingness. They should also serve to convey a sense of 
how, on this approach, perception, and cognition are taken to be 
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fundamentally relational phenomena, and ultimately how we as cognisers 
exist as—and in—a dynamic, relational web embedded within the natural 
and cultural worlds, actively constructing and shaping our environments 
through our activity. It is this sense that I believe will particularly resonate 
with those who are familiar with the kinds of non-Western philosophy 
enagaged with in this collection of essays. This brief exploration will thus 
perhaps provide a gateway for philosophers from a diverse set of back-
grounds to enter into the worlds of extended and enactive cognitive 
science.
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